City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health

462 U.S. 416 (1983) · Docket No. 81-746

Full caption: City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc.

Effectively overruled by Casey

Court
U.S. Supreme Court
Argued
November 30, 1982
Decided
June 15, 1983
Majority author
Powell, J.
Joined by
Burger, C.J.; Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ.
Vote
6-3

Question presented

Whether Akron ordinance provisions requiring (1) second-trimester abortions in hospitals, (2) parental consent for minors, (3) specific informed consent information, (4) a 24-hour waiting period, and (5) 'humane and sanitary' disposal of fetal remains, are constitutional.

Holding

All five provisions are unconstitutional. Hospital requirement for second-trimester abortions imposes unreasonable costs. Parental consent lacks adequate judicial bypass. Informed consent script is designed to discourage abortion.

Key reasoning

Justice Powell applied Roe's trimester framework strictly, striking down regulations that had the effect of discouraging abortion or increasing its costs.

§ 1 Reasoning

Justice Powell applied Roe's trimester framework strictly, striking down regulations that had the effect of discouraging abortion or increasing its costs.

§ 2 Opinions

Majority

Powell, J.

Burger, C.J.; Brennan, Marshall, Blackmun, Stevens, JJ.

All five provisions are unconstitutional. Hospital requirement for second-trimester abortions imposes unreasonable costs. Parental consent lacks adequate judicial bypass. Informed consent script is designed to discourage abortion. 24-hour waiting period is 'arbitrary and inflexible.' Fetal remains disposal provision is unconstitutionally vague.

Dissent

O'Connor, J.

White, Rehnquist, JJ.

First articulation of the 'unduly burdensome' standard that would eventually become Casey's undue burden test. Called Roe's trimester framework 'on a collision course with itself.'

“The State's interest is in ensuring that the woman's consent is informed and unpressured; the critical factor is whether she obtains the necessary information and counseling from a qualified person, not the identity of the person from whom she obtains it.” Powell, J. (majority) · 462 U.S. at 448

§ 3 Key quotes

“The Roe framework is clearly on a collision course with itself.”
O'Connor, J. (dissenting)462 U.S. at 458

§ 4 Practical effect

Second-trimester hospital requirements invalidated. Informed consent 'scripts' and waiting periods invalidated. Legal architecture would later change under Casey (1992).

§ 5 Perspectives

The summaries below are descriptive, not evaluative — an attempt to represent fairly how each camp typically frames this case.

Abolitionist framing

Not a significant abolitionist reference. Represents the height of Roe-era judicial invalidation of pro-life laws.

Mainstream pro-life framing

Motivated development of the 'undue burden' framework that would later succeed in Casey.

Pro-choice framing

Strong Roe-era ruling protecting abortion access.

§ 6 Significance

3/ 10

Superseded by Casey. O'Connor's dissent is historically important as the first articulation of the standard that later prevailed.

Legal precedential weight4
Practical impact on access4
Movement relevance (abolitionist)2
Enduring relevance, 20262

§ 7 Sources

Editorial note Justice O'Connor's dissent contains the first Supreme Court articulation of the 'undue burden' framework.