Abhortion for the abolition of abortion
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Cases/ U.S. Supreme Court/ 2000

Hill v. Colorado

530 U.S. 703 (2000) · Docket No. 98-1856

Full caption: Hill et al. v. Colorado et al.

Doubtful

Court
U.S. Supreme Court
Argued
January 19, 2000
Decided
June 28, 2000
Majority author
Stevens, J.
Joined by
Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.
Vote
6-3
Case No. 15 of 28 All cases, indexed

Question presented

Whether Colorado's statute making it unlawful within 100 feet of a health facility entrance to 'knowingly approach' within 8 feet of another person, without consent, for purposes of 'passing a leaflet or handbill,' 'displaying a sign,' or 'engaging in oral protest, education, or counseling' violates the First Amendment.

Holding

The Colorado statute is constitutional. It is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation that leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.

Key reasoning

Justice Stevens held the law was content-neutral because it applied to all approaches, not just anti-abortion speech, and served significant state interests in protecting patients accessing medical care.

§ 1 Reasoning

Justice Stevens held the law was content-neutral because it applied to all approaches, not just anti-abortion speech, and served significant state interests in protecting patients accessing medical care.

§ 2 Opinions

Majority

Stevens, J.

Rehnquist, C.J.; O'Connor, Souter, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.

The Colorado statute is constitutional. It is a content-neutral time, place, and manner regulation that leaves open ample alternative channels of communication.

Concurrence

Souter, J.

O'Connor, Ginsburg, Breyer, JJ.

Emphasized the content-neutrality of the statute.

Dissent

Scalia, J.

Thomas, J.

Argued the statute was content-based and should fail strict scrutiny; sharply criticized the majority for creating an 'abortion-speech-only' First Amendment doctrine.

Dissent

Kennedy, J.

Not joined by any other justice

Characterized the statute as vague, overbroad, and viewpoint discriminatory.

“Today's decision is not an isolated distortion of our traditional constitutional principles, but is one of many aggressively pro-abortion novelties announced by the Court in recent years... Today, however, the ability of a citizen to approach another person on a public sidewalk to hand out a leaflet, to display a sign, or to speak, is no longer a First Amendment right.” Scalia, J. (dissenting) · 530 U.S. at 741

§ 3 Practical effect

Colorado and similar 'floating buffer zone' laws were upheld. The ruling was in significant tension with McCullen v. Coakley (2014), which struck down a Massachusetts fixed buffer zone. Hill has been widely criticized as anomalous First Amendment doctrine.

§ 4 Perspectives

The summaries below are descriptive, not evaluative — an attempt to represent fairly how each camp typically frames this case.

Abolitionist framing

Abolitionists sharply criticize Hill as an example of anti-pro-life bias in First Amendment doctrine. Its continued vitality after McCullen (2014) is doubtful.

Mainstream pro-life framing

Widely criticized as departing from ordinary First Amendment doctrine to disfavor pro-life speech.

Pro-choice framing

Defended as necessary protection for patients accessing sensitive healthcare.

§ 5 Significance

4/ 10

In significant tension with McCullen (2014); several Justices (Scalia in McCullen; Thomas, Alito) have urged overruling.

Legal precedential weight4
Practical impact on access2
Movement relevance (abolitionist)5
Enduring relevance, 20265

§ 6 Sources

Cites earlier cases

Madsen v. Women's Health Center (1994)

Cited by later cases

McCullen v. Coakley (2014)
Editorial note In McCullen (2014), Scalia's concurrence urged overruling Hill; the majority pointedly declined to reach the question.