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Cases/ U.S. Supreme Court/ 1965

Griswold v. Connecticut

381 U.S. 479 (1965) · Docket No. 496 (1964 term)

Full caption: Griswold et al. v. Connecticut

Good law

Court
U.S. Supreme Court
Argued
March 29, 1965
Decided
June 7, 1965
Majority author
Douglas, J.
Joined by
Warren, C.J.; Clark, Brennan, Goldberg, JJ.
Vote
7-2
Case No. 2 of 28 All cases, indexed

Question presented

Whether Connecticut's Comstock-era law prohibiting use of contraceptives even by married couples violates the Constitution.

Holding

The Connecticut law is unconstitutional. Various guarantees of the Bill of Rights create 'zones of privacy' — 'penumbras' — that include marital privacy.

Key reasoning

Justice Douglas's famous 'penumbras and emanations' reasoning located a right of marital privacy in the shadow of specific Bill of Rights protections. This was the foundational modern privacy precedent.

§ 1 Reasoning

Justice Douglas's famous 'penumbras and emanations' reasoning located a right of marital privacy in the shadow of specific Bill of Rights protections. This was the foundational modern privacy precedent.

§ 2 Opinions

Majority

Douglas, J.

Warren, C.J.; Clark, Brennan, Goldberg, JJ.

The Connecticut law is unconstitutional. Various guarantees of the Bill of Rights create 'zones of privacy' — 'penumbras' — that include marital privacy.

Concurrence

Goldberg, J.

Warren, C.J.; Brennan, J.

Emphasized Ninth Amendment.

Concurrence

Harlan, J.

Not joined by any other justice

Grounded in Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

Concurrence

White, J.

Not joined by any other justice

Grounded in Fourteenth Amendment Due Process.

Dissent

Black, J.

Stewart, J.

Textualist critique — 'a right of privacy' is not written into the Constitution.

Dissent

Stewart, J.

Black, J.

Called the Connecticut law 'uncommonly silly' but not unconstitutional.

“Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guarantees that help give them life and substance.” Douglas, J. (majority) · 381 U.S. at 484

§ 3 Key quotes

“Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy surrounding the marriage relationship.”
Douglas, J. (majority)381 U.S. at 485-486

§ 4 Practical effect

Contraception legalized for married couples; extended to unmarried individuals in Eisenstadt (1972). Foundation for Roe (1973), Lawrence (2003), Obergefell (2015).

§ 5 Perspectives

The summaries below are descriptive, not evaluative — an attempt to represent fairly how each camp typically frames this case.

Abolitionist framing

Abolitionists generally do not target Griswold directly, though Justice Thomas's Dobbs concurrence called for reconsidering it (no other Justice joined). Some abolitionists argue that Griswold's privacy framework is foundational to the entire error of Roe.

Mainstream pro-life framing

Traditionally not a pro-life target. Some conservative legal scholars critique the doctrinal reasoning.

Pro-choice framing

Foundational precedent for personal privacy in intimate relationships.

§ 6 Significance

7/ 10

Foundational privacy precedent for all subsequent reproductive rights cases; contested after Thomas's Dobbs concurrence.

Legal precedential weight9
Practical impact on access6
Movement relevance (abolitionist)3
Enduring relevance, 20265

§ 7 Sources

Cited by later cases

Eisenstadt v. Baird (1972) Roe v. Wade (1973) Lawrence v. Texas (2003) Obergefell v. Hodges (2015)
Editorial note Estelle Griswold, director of Planned Parenthood League of Connecticut, was the challenger. The case involved a Comstock-era statute that had been in force since 1879 (introduced by P.T. Barnum as a Connecticut state senator).