Doe v. Bolton

410 U.S. 179 (1973) · Docket No. 70-40

Full caption: Doe et al. v. Bolton, Attorney General of Georgia, et al.

Overruled by Dobbs

Court
U.S. Supreme Court
Argued
December 13, 1971
Decided
January 22, 1973
Majority author
Blackmun, J.
Joined by
Burger, C.J.; Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, JJ.
Vote
7-2

Question presented

Whether Georgia's Model Penal Code-style abortion statute (permitting abortion only in cases of danger to woman's life or health, fetal defect, or rape) — with procedural requirements including hospital accreditation, committee approval, and two concurring physicians — is constitutional.

Holding

Georgia's procedural requirements are unconstitutional. The 'health' exception recognized by the statute must be construed broadly to include 'all factors — physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age.'

Key reasoning

Justice Blackmun struck down Georgia's procedural restrictions as unduly burdening the constitutional right recognized in Roe. Critically, the opinion defined 'health' expansively — a definition that became the operational engine of Roe's regime.

§ 1 Reasoning

Justice Blackmun struck down Georgia's procedural restrictions as unduly burdening the constitutional right recognized in Roe. Critically, the opinion defined 'health' expansively — a definition that became the operational engine of Roe's regime.

§ 2 Opinions

Majority

Blackmun, J.

Burger, C.J.; Douglas, Brennan, Stewart, Marshall, Powell, JJ.

Georgia's procedural requirements are unconstitutional. The 'health' exception recognized by the statute must be construed broadly to include 'all factors — physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age.'

Concurrence

Burger, C.J.

Not joined by any other justice

Joined majority but emphasized narrow scope.

Concurrence

Douglas, J.

Not joined by any other justice

Elaborated on the right to privacy.

Dissent

White, J.

Rehnquist, J.

Same dissent as in Roe: called the Court's rulings 'an exercise of raw judicial power.'

Dissent

Rehnquist, J.

Not joined by any other justice

Historical dissent noting states' authority to regulate.

“The medical judgment may be exercised in the light of all factors — physical, emotional, psychological, familial, and the woman's age — relevant to the well-being of the patient. All these factors may relate to health.” Blackmun, J. (majority) · 410 U.S. at 192

§ 3 Practical effect

Combined with Roe, Doe's 'health' definition meant that no abortion could be effectively prohibited at any stage if a willing physician would attest to any of the listed factors. Pro-life advocates have described the result as 'abortion on demand through all nine months.'

§ 4 Perspectives

The summaries below are descriptive, not evaluative — an attempt to represent fairly how each camp typically frames this case.

Abolitionist framing

Abolitionists cite Doe as showing that Roe's 'health' exception was designed to permit abortion on demand. The 'psychological/familial' health rationale is criticized as unlimited.

Mainstream pro-life framing

Mainstream pro-life groups have long argued that Doe's expansive 'health' definition, combined with Roe, effectively legalized abortion throughout pregnancy. This framing is now central to the movement's history.

Pro-choice framing

Advocates view Doe as necessary companion to Roe, ensuring that women's health could not be sacrificed to fetal life.

§ 5 Significance

7/ 10

Companion case to Roe. Overruled by Dobbs but historically foundational to understanding Roe-era abortion access.

Legal precedential weight8
Practical impact on access9
Movement relevance (abolitionist)7
Enduring relevance, 20264

§ 6 Sources

Editorial note Sandra Cano, the 'Mary Doe' plaintiff, later became a pro-life activist and repeatedly sought (unsuccessfully) to overturn the ruling in her own name.